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Abstraet 
In a eontinuous trading market, taking efficieney as given, variations in liquidity ean be 
measured by simultaneous changes in both irnmediaey costs and depth. Past theoretical and 
empirical microstructure literature is, however, one-dimensional. Only a reduced number of 
empirical studies consider irnmediacy costs and depth proxies together. Using intraday data 
from the NYSE, this paper deals with how liquidity regularly behaves and how it reacts to 
changing market conditions by concurrently analyzing intraday regular patterns of alternative 
irnmediacy costs and depth measures. A new liquidity measure called BLM is introduced that 
captures simultaneous changes in both liquidity dimensions. It is evidenced that intraday 
patterns in market making costs can (at least partially) explain the regular changes in 
liquidity and that only volatility changes have an unambiguous effect on liquidity. In this 
way, this study looks in greater depth into, and is able to give more general conclusions 
about, the general behavior and the determinants of liquidity at the NYSE. 
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1. - Introduction. 
Liquidity is probably one of the most widely used terms in finance and it has given rise to an 
important theoretical and empirical research effort. Microstructure researchers have evidenced 
that liquidity matters as far as asset pricing (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Eleswarapu 
and Reinganum, 1993; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996) and market competitiveness (e.g., 
Huang and Sto11, 1996; Blume and Goldstein, 1997) are involved. However, there is neither a 
common understanding of what liquidity means nor a general consensus as to how to measure 
it. Q'Hara (1995, pg. 215) remarked that 'liquidity, like pomography, is easily recognized but 
no so easily defined [ ... ]'. This apparent paradox might be explained by the inherent 
multidimensionality of the concept (e.g., Grossman and Mi11er, 1988). Drawing on the 
definitions by Black (1971) and Kyle (1985), a market for a given stock is liquid if: (a) it is 
always possible immediately to buy or se11 sma11 quantities of stock. (b) Investors can, in 
absence of private information, buy or se111arge amounts of the stock over a long period of 
time without expecting significant changes in prices. Moreover, investors can immediately 
buy or se11 large blocks of stock, though they wi11 face proportional premiums or discounts. 
Finally, time that is required for price adjustment after a random and uninformative shock 
(resiliency) is short. (c) The difference between the best bid and offer price IS sma11 
(tightness). (d) Depth, the minimum trading volume needed to change prices, IS large. 
Therefore, liquidity requires trading to be continuous, and prices to fu11y reflect relevant 
information and to quickly adjust to new information. Moreover, the lower the immediacy 
costs and the larger the depth the more liquid a given stock will be. In other words, if we 
consider a stock market with a continuous trading system and take the level of market 
efficiency as given, liquidity could be measured by simultaneously considering both 
immediacy costs and depth. 
Despite this apparent bidimensionality, microstructure theory has mainly focused on 
immediacy costs. The analysis of the theoretical determinants of the quoted bid-ask spread 
(e.g., Ho and Sto11, 1981; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Huang and 
Sto11, 1997), and the relative magnitude of the cost-components of market making (e.g., Sto11, 
1989; George et al., 1991) were widely considered topics. In these models, however, depth 
was avoided by assuming that trades were of constant size. The depth dimension has also 
been modeled (e.g., Kyle 1985 & 1989; Subrahmanyam, 1991). Nonetheless, in these cases 
immediacy costs were not considered since market makers set a single liquidation price 
conditional on the available information. Moreover, altemative measures have been supplied 
to approximate either of these two liquidity dimensions. Relative spread (e.g., McInish and 
2 
Wood, 1992), effective spread (e.g., Petersen and Fialkowski, 1993), realized spread (e.g., 
Huang and Stoll, 1996), and implicit spread (e.g., Roll, 1984) are frequent measures of 
immediacy costs. Quoted depth (e.g., Kavajecz, 1998), realized depth (e.g., Engle and Lange, 
1997) and liquidity ratio (e.g., Kluger and Stephan, 1997) proxy for price sensitivity to order 
flow. These 'liquidity' measures have been applied to both cross-sectional and time series 
empirical analyses. Cross-sectional studies have dealt with topics such as illiquidity premiums 
in stock retums (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1986), cost comparisons and integration 
between markets (e.g. Lee, 1993; Bessembinder and Kaufrnan, 1997), and evaluations of 
specialists' performance (e.g. Madhavan and Sofianos, 1998). Time series studies have 
covered event studies (e.g. Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986), regular pattems in immediacy costs 
(e.g. Wood et al., 1985) and liquidity determinants (e.g. Mclnish and Wood, 1992). As far as 
we know, however, empirical studies considering simultaneously immediacy costs and depth 
are scarce. Lee et al. (1993) is an important exception. For a sample of NYSE firms, they 
observed that liquidity providers used both spread and depth to actively manage changes in 
information asymmetry risks associated with eaming announcements. With the same premise 
that motivated the Lee et al. (1993) paper, that is, assertions about changes in globalliquidity 
can only be made when changes in both immediacy costs and depth are considered together, 
this paper offers a more general outline ofhow liquidity behaves. 
Using intraday data for a sample ofNYSE-listed common stocks, our study extends previous 
time series empirical analysis of liquidity by concurrently studying the most relevant 
measures of immediacy costs and price sensitivity to order flow. Additionally, with the 
intention of capturing simultaneous changes in both immediacy costs and depth, a new 
liquidity measure is introduced that we have called the Bidimensional Liquidity Measure 
(BLM). This simple and direct measure allows us to verify general intuitions about the global 
behavior of liquidity and opens up the possibility of extending prior time series and cross-
sectíonal empírical work that has resorted to spread or depth alone to approximate liquidity. A 
comparative analysis of these altemative liquidity proxies is driven to the study of the 
existence of regular pattems in líquidity and to ascertain how liquidity reacts to altemative 
market scenarios. 
Several papers have evidenced time regularities in immediacy costs in markets with distinct 
microstructures, usually consisting of U-shaped or reversed J-shaped intraday pattems and 
higher values on Mondays (e.g., McInish and Wood 1992, Foster and Viswanathan 1993, for 
the NYSE; Lehman and Modest 1994, for the Tokyo Stock Exchange; Rubio and Tapia 1996, 
3 
for the Spanish Stock Exchange). Lee et aL (1993) and Lehman and Modest (1994) also 
observed finn size effects on these regular pattems. Evidence conceming regular pattems in 
the other liquidity dimension is scarce (again, Lee et al., 1993, studied intraday regularities in 
quoted depth). Previous empirical studies, however, do not report evidence on why 
immediacy costs and depth experienced those regular pattems. This paper wi11 show that 
liquidity experiences predictable intraday pattems that differ with the trading frequency of 
stocks. Moreover, it will be evidenced that regular pattems in 1iquidity can be exp1ained (at 
1east partia11y) by the intraday changes in market making costs. 
Three mam costs have been associated with market making: order-processing costs, 
inventory-h01ding costs and adverse se1ection costs. Order-processing costs reflect the nature 
ofthe trading mechanism (exchange fees, transfer taxes, etc.). They are usua11y considered as 
a constant part of the quoted spread (e.g., Sto11, 1989; G10sten and Harris, 1988). Inventory-
holding costs arise from the suboptima1 portfo1io position the risk averse market maker is 
ob1iged to ho1d when providing dea1er services (e.g., Amihud and Mende1sson, 1980; Ho and 
Sto11, 1981). Fina11y, adverse se1ection costs are faced because of trading with individua1s 
who are better infonned about the true value of the stock (e.g., Bagehot, 1971; G10sten and 
Mi1grom, 1985). Liquidity providers are assumed to widen the quoted spread or reduce the 
quoted depth in order to compensate for or protect themselves from increases in the 
magnitude of these three cost-components. The re1evance of each cost component on the 
magnitude of the quoted bid-ask spread has generated a 10t of interest. 1 Litt1e research effort, 
however, has been devoted to studying the time series regular pattems (exceptions are Foster 
and Viswanathan, 1993; Madhavan et al., 1996) and time series market detenninants of the 
theoretica1 components of the bid-ask spread. In this paper we concentrate on the adverse 
selection costs, estimated as the revision in the expected true value of the stock after each 
trade (see G10sten and Mi1grom, 1985; G10sten and Harris, 1988). This paper wi11 show that 
infonnation asymmetry risk is not unifonn1y distributed a10ng the trading session. 
Expectations conceming when infonnation asymmetries are 1arger or when informed trading 
is more probable may exp1ain why similar market conditions cause different 1iquidity 
adjustments. 
Activity, volatility, infonned trading, off-competence and tick restriction are used to describe 
a1temative market scenarios. Past theoretica1 and empirica1 microstructure 1iterature is 
1 E.g. Glosten and Harris (1988); Stoll (1989); George et al. (1991); de Jong et al. (1996); Huang and Stoll 
(1996); Kim and Odgen (1996) and Huang and Stoll (1997). 
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sometimes unc1ear in predicting how liquidity should react to contemporaneous changes in 
these market conditions, either because the predicted changes in immediacy costs and depth 
are not compatible with an unambiguous variation in liquidity or simply because different 
models give rise to different predictions. This paper will show that liquidity adjusts to 
contemporaneous changes in market conditions and these adjustments are larger than 
expected by the predictable changes in the market variables. But, only changes in volatility 
will have an unambiguous effect on liquidity. Moreover, higher activity, unexpected trade size 
and volatility indicate higher informativeness of trades. However, more off-competence and 
more tick persistence signal lower informativeness of trades. Finally, this multivariate 
analysis allows other microstructure topics strongly linked to liquidity to be dealt with. The 
trade size effects (see Easley and Q'Hara, 1987), the cream skimming effect on liquidity (e.g., 
Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997), and the tick restriction effect on depth (e.g., Harris, 1994) 
are analyzed. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the different immediacy costs and depth 
measures, and introduces the BLM. Section 3 presents data, sampling technique and sorne 
methodological aspects. Moreover, this section reports sorne descriptive statistics and studies 
independence of immediacy costs and depth. Section 4 reports empirical evidence about 
intraday and daily regular pattems in liquidity. Section 5 summarizes the main empirical 
findings about the contemporaneous adjustments of liquidity to changing market conditions. 
Finally, section 6 conc1udes. 
2. - Measuring Iiquidity. 
2.1. - Immediacy costs and adverse selection costs. 
The quoted bid-ask spread is the measure which has been most commonly used to approach 
immediacy costs. It captures the costs of directIy trading at the specialist's quoted prices 
instead of introducing a limit order. The economic value of such costs could be measured 
using the relative spread, which is simply the ratio of quoted spread to midpoint of the quoted 
spread (see equation 1). A first implicit assumption when quoted spread is employed as a 
measure of immediacy costs is that all trades are performed at the quoted bid or ask price. 
Empirical evidence has reported, however, that it is possible to trade at better prices than 
those quoted by the specialist (e.g., Lee and Ready, 1991). These price improvements may be 
due to stopped orders, hidden limit orders, crossing orders, and floor broker or specialist's 
own trades (see Hasbrouck et al., 1993). The effective spread (e.g., Petersen and Fialkowski, 
1993) captures the notion that if a price improvement occurs immediacy costs will be lower 
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than those measured by the quoted spread (see equation 2, where PI is the transaction price). 
A second implicit assumption of the quoted spread, and also of the effective spread, is that 
quotes do not change after a trade. Theoretical microstructure models (e.g., Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Sto11, 1989) have shown, however, that trades convey information, modify 
specialists' expectations about the true value of the asset and induce changes in the quoted bid 
and ask prices. The realized spread (see equation 3, where I(A) is 1 whenever A is true and 
zero otherwise, and P I+, is a proxy for the post-trade economic value of the stock) takes into 
account that, when quotes change after a trade, the specialist does not necessarily realize a11 
the effective spread. In fact, after a trade at the posted ask or bid, quotes usua11y move against 
specialist interests (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1988; Huang and Sto 11, 1996; Blume and Glostein, 
1997).2 
(1) 




The difference between the effective spread and the realized spread assesses the price impact 
of a trade. The magnitud e of the price impact wi11 positively depend on the probability of a 
trade being motivated by not-public1y-known information. The greater the price impact of a 
trade the greater the information this trade convey to the market. Therefore, the price impact 
of a trade captures market makers' losses with informed traders (e.g., Huang and Sto11, 1996). 
In periods when the specialist believes there is a higher probability of informed trading, any 
trade should have a larger impact on prices and, therefore, reduce the spread that the market 
maker fina11y realizes. Consequently, the realized spread represents market maker's 
compensation for order-processing costs and inventory-holding costs. Let us define the half-
effective spread as in (4), where Xt equals 1 for buyer initiated orders and -1 for se11er initiated 
orders, mI is a proxy for the pre-trade true value of the stock and Pt is the price of a trade at t. 
Let us also define the half-realized spread as in (5), where Pt+, is a proxy for the post-trade 
true value of the stock. The difference (see equation 6) will be our estimator of adverse 
2 Roll (1984) obtained an estimator on the quoted spread based on the negative eorre1ation indueed on priees by 
the bid-ask bounee effeet. George et al. (1991) and Kim and Odgen (1996) have 1ately improved this implieit 
spread. Although this altemative measure of irnmediaey eosts was also eonsidered in the analysis, the results add 
nothing to the intuition obtained with the other irnmediaey eosts proxies. Therefore, results for the implieit 
spread are not reported, though they are available upon request. 
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selection costs associated to a particular trade. Huang and Sto11 (1996) and Bessembinder and 
Kaufman (1996) have al so applied this procedure to cross-sectional studies. As far as we 
know, however, this is the first study that wi11 consider the time series properties of this 
estimator. 
2.2. -Depth 
(liJ)EFSt = Xr(Pt-mJ 




Depth, or sensitivity of prices to order flow, is usually approximated by the total quoted size 
at the best bid and ask prices. It measures how many shares could be traded at the existing 
quoted prices. Although the specialist decides how much depth is to be offered, quoted depth 
may represent the specialist's own trading interest, the trading interest in the crowd, existing 
limit orders, or even any possible combination (e.g., Hasbrouck et al., 1993; Bessembinder 
and Kaufman, 1997). Therefore, quoted depth does not necessarily reflect the effective market 
depth (see Kavajecz, 1998). In the same way that the effective spread is lower than or equal to 
the quoted spread, the effective depth is larger than or equal to the quoted depth. RecentIy, 
Engle and Lange (1997) have introduced a new depth measure ca11ed VNET. It could be 
understood as a realized depth. VNET captures how much one-sided volume (ex ces s of buyer 
or seller initiated trading volume) has been needed to change the midpoint ofthe quoted bid-
ask spread, as an estimation of the slope of the specialist's supply curve (see equation 7, 
where Xg takes the value 1 for buyer initiated trades and -1 for se11er initiated trades, and k is 
the number of trades between two different values of the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask 
spread). VNET is conceptually similar to the liquidity ratio ofKluger and Stephan (1997).3 
VNET = IIxgvolJ 
ig=l I 
(7) 
2.3. - The Bidimensional Liquidity Measure. 
This study's premise is that it is not possible to infer changes in globalliquidity based solely 
3 The liquidity ratio (LR) is just the ratio of accumulated trading volume to accumulated change in prices during 
a given time interval. It ignores whether volume comes from buyer or seller initiated trades. The LR crucially 
depends on the magnitude of the change in prices: small changes in prices move the liquidity ratio to extremely 
high values. VNET, however, depends on the quantity that needs to be traded in order to move prices (no matter 
how much). In our opinion, sensitivity ofprices to order flow is better captured using VNET than through the LR 
and it has better properties. This leads us to discard the latter measure in our analysis. 
7 
on immediacy costs or depth. Liquidity unambiguously changes whenever immediacy costs 
and depth move in the opposite direction, or one of them changes and the other one remains 
constant. From this point of view, it is not correct to assert that a narrower spread implies 
more liquidity without studying how depth has simultaneously evolved.4 We introduce a 
simple direct measure of liquidity that captures simultaneous relative changes in both 
immediacy costs and depth. This measure is named the Bidimensional Liquidity Measure 
(BLM). When the change in liquidity is ambiguous, that is, when immediacy costs and depth 
move in the same direction, BLM will reflect which dimension of liquidity has experienced a 
relatively larger variation. 
BLM consists of a corrected ratio of depth to immediacy costs for a given time interval. The 
general expression for BLM appears in equation 8, where Dt and Jet represent sorne indicators 
of depth and immediacy costs, respectively, during a given time interval t. D:~¡ and IC:~¡ are 
sorne indicator of the past evolution of both liquidity dimensions. Therefore, an increase 
(decrease) in BLM is interpreted as a liquidity improvement (worsening). The direction of a 
change in BLM will depend on the relative magnitude ofthe changes in the relative depth and 
relative immediacy costs. Observe that, in sorne sense, BLM is a proxy of depth-immediacy 
costs elasticity. 





Je t- J 
t-k 
3. - Data, rnethodology and sorne descriptive statistics. 
3.1. - Data, sample and methodology. 
(8) 
The transaction and quote data used in this study were obtained from the TAQ (Trade and 
Quote) Database corresponding to the full year 1996. Data consists of 150 common stocks, 
sampled from the population of 2574 NYSE-listed common stocks in January-1996 using 
Systematic Sampling based on market capitalization.5 Stocks that experienced stock-splits, 
those that did not trade the full year and those without quotes and trades registers for more 
4 See Lee et al. (1993, pg. 49-51) for further discussion on this issue. 
5 With Systematic Sampling (SS), aH stocks have the same probability of being finaHy chosen, as with Simple 
Random Sampling (SRS). However, the [mal SS-sample is more representative ofthe sample population than the 
SRS-sample. SS consists of generating a random number k between 1 and the nearest integer to 2574/150. Then, 
the sample population is sorted by market capitalization and the stocks selected are those in the positions rkth, 
where r=1, ... ,150. See Som (1996) pg. 81-90 for a more complete exposition. 
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than two consecutive trading days were eliminated. Finally, from the remainder firms, two 
subsamples were formed taking the 25 with the largest (MFTS) and lowest (LFTS) mean 
trade frequency respectively (listed in appendix 1). Trades not codified as 'regular trades' 
have been discarded. All quote registers previous to the opening quote, those with bid-ask 
spreads lower than or equal to zero or quoted depth equal to zero have also been discarded. 
When prices and quotes must be considered together, the so-called 'five seconds rule' (see 
Lee and Ready, 1991) has been used in order to assign to each trade its corresponding quotes. 
All previously revised measures have been constructed in an hourly basis. The trading session 
has been divided in seven time intervals: [9:30-10:00h.), [10:00-11 :OOh.), [11 :00-12:00h.), 
[12:00-13:00h.), [13:00-14:00h.), [14:00-15:00h.), and [15:00-closing]. Following Foster and 
Viswanathan (1993), volume and transactions corresponding to the first time interval have 
been multiplied by two, in order to have comparable magnitudes. All immediacy costs, 
adverse selection costs and depth measures analyzed are described in appendix B. In general 
terms, relative spread and quoted depth are weighted by time, and effective spread and price 
impact are weighted by trade volume. The midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread assigned to 
the trade i is used as the pre-trade true value ofthe stock, and the mid-point ofthe quoted bid-
ask spread associated with the first trade reported at least five minutes later is considered as 
the post-trade value of the stock.6 VNET is weighted by the magnitude of the change in the 
mid-point of the quoted spread. BLM is computed as a corrected ratio of depth weighted by 
time to relative spread weighted by time for a given time interval. The concrete expression for 
BLM appears in equation 9. MVoldh is the mean volume per trade in hour h of trading day d 
(h={1, ... ,7}, d={I, ... ,5}). Defined in this way, immediacy costs and depth are expressed in 
relative terms to stock price and trading activity respectively. Finally, MAj(x) , a moving 
average of its n previous values, divides each component x.7 Computed in this way, BLM 
captures relative changes in depth and relative spread without getting rid of the regular 
patterns ofboth components. 
6 The quoted spread and the quoted depth have also been computed using last quotes for each time interval. The 
effective spread and the price impact have been defined using an unweighted mean too. Price impact has been 
computed for different values of T and using the trade price as a proxy for the post-trade true value. Results for 
these measures are not generally reported because of space limitations. However, if any remarkable difference 
does occur, it will be mentioned. Results are available upon request. 
7 The first moving mean for the BLM is obtained using as many observations as there were hourly trading 
intervals in January (n=154). Therefore, the BLM is computed only from February to December. 
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{DWT.(d.h)/MVol }./ MA n (Dwr(i.k) / MVol. ) BLM(d.h) = t (d.h) 1 j=/ l-j (I.k) , 
t RSWI; / MA~=, ( RSWI;_ j ) (9) 
S.t. iE{1, ... ,5},kE{1, ... ,7} 
3.2. - Sorne descriptive statistics. 
A preliminary analysis of data reveals sorne interesting descriptive statistics, summarized in 
Table 1. For both the MFTS and the LFTS, around 24% of trades were at prices inside the 
quoted bid-ask spread. Additionally, after a transaction made at the ask or bid price, quotes 
were revised about half of times. These revisions usua11y consisted of an increase (decrease) 
in the midpoint ofthe quoted bid-ask spread after a trade at the ask (bid) price.8 These results 
are enough to justify the use of measures of immediacy costs other than the quoted bid-ask 
spread: all trades did not take place at the ask or bid price and quotes did not always remain 
constant after a trade at the ask or bid. Moreover, most of the time quotes gave rise to spreads 
equal to the tick or two times the tick. 
The percentage of the quoted bid-ask spread attributable to adverse selection costs, computed 
using decomposition in (4)-(6), conforms with those obtained in Sto11 (1989), Affleck-Graves 
et al. (1994), Huang and Sto11 (1996) and Kim and Odgen (1996). These authors obtained that 
a large part ofthe quoted bid-ask spread was due to information asymmetry risk (Glosten and 
Harris, 1988, and George et al., 1991, however, obtained sma11er percentages). In mean 
hourly terms, adverse selection costs for the LFTS represent a larger part of the quoted bid-
ask spread than for the MFTS only when volume is not taken into account (see Table 1). 
When we control for volume per trade, the percentage of adverse selection costs increases for 
both subsamples. This result supports the intuition in Easley and O'Hara (1987) and 
Hasbrouck (1988) that larger trades convey more information. . 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
3.3. - Bidirnensionality and dependence. 
Lee et al. (1993) reported a negative relationship between quoted spread and quoted depth, in 
the sense that wide spreads tended to be related to low depths and narrow spreads tended to be 
associated with high depths. This section generalizes this result by showing that specialists 
combine immediacy costs and depth in order to manage liquidity, independent1y of the 
8 Notice that the larger importance of quote revisions for the LFTS is due to a larger percentage of simultaneous 
changes in both bid and ask. 
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proxies used. If specialists in particular, and liquidity providers in general, support costs 
associated with market-making, and the prices and quantities they quote are the too1s 
avai1ab1e to manage such costs, it seems reasonable to expect sorne degree of dependence 
between the evolution of the two 1iquidity dimensions. Contingency tables are used to 
eva1uate the mutual independence of immediacy costs and depth proxies. Each hour1y 
observation is c1assified into one of four categories, comparing the va1ue of each of the two 
variables with the respective median.9 Tab1e 2 reports the results oftesting the null hypothesis 
of independence between each pair of measures considered for the MFTS. A relationship is 
taken as positive when variables are simu1taneous1y aboye or be10w their respective medians 
with a higher frequency than would be expected under the null hypothesis of independence, 
and negative whenever the two variables move in opposite directions with a higher frequency 
than expected. In summary, depth measures are generally dependent and positive1y related. 
Relative spread and effective spread are found to be independent, which confirms the intuition 
that the consideration of price improvements introduces new dynamics in the immediacy costs 
dimensiono More important, immediacy costs and sensitivity of prices to order flow are not 
independent dimensions, and their re1ationship is negative: high immediacy costs are usually 
associated with low depth (high sensitivity of prices) and low immediacy costs tend to be 
linked with high depths (low sensitivity of prices). Price impact is positively associated to 
immediacy costs measures and negative1y re1ated to quoted depth. However, it is a1so 
positively connected with the realized depth. Results for the LFTS sample are rough1y the 
same. In general, Tab1e 2 can be summarized by saying that liquidity providers usually 
combine the prices and quantities they offer for trading in order to manage liquidity and, 
therefore, changes in both variables are not taken as independent decisions. Contingency 
tables for BLM show that this measure is not on1y positive1y re1ated to quoted depth and 
negative1y re1ated to the re1ative spread but is in general positive1y re1ated to all depth proxies 
and negative1y re1ated to immediacy costs measures. This suggests that using a1ternative 
proxies for immediacy costs and depth in (9) shou1d not significant1y change the main results 
ofthis paper. 
[Insert Tab1e 2 around here] 
4. - Intraday regular patterns in liquidity. 
This section focuses on the regular behavior of liquidity. Given the evidence reported in 
9 Hourly intervals in which one ofthe variables is equal to the median have been discarded. This does not induce 
any bias in the results of the test because these cases are negligible. 
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previous subsection, regular patterns of immediacy costs and depth should move, in sorne 
way, in opposite direction. To study whether altemative measures experience similar intraday 
and daily regularities will allow the overall regular pattems of liquidity at the NYSE to be 
looked at in greater depth. 
For each liquidity measure considered, equations (10.1)-(10.2) have been estimated using a 
pooled GLS estimation procedure, which is robust to the presence of general 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within each cross-section and also control s for 
heteroskedasticity between cross-sections. i represents the stock (the cross-sectional unit) and 
t the hour (i=1, ... ,25; t=1,2, ... ,1778). Yit represents a concrete liquidity measure. DHst (for s=2 
to 7) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the sth hour of the session and zero 
otherwise. DDht (for h=2 to 5) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the hth trading 
day of the week (Monday-Friday) and zero otherwise. 1O Eit is the error term, such that 
E{E'E}=f2 We allow for an autoregressive structure of order Z on residuals. The number Z of 
autoregressive terms is determined from a general-to-particular strategy.ll The objective is to 
control for autocorrelation in each cross-section and to concentrate on parameter estimates 
that capture only contemporaneous effects. 
7 5 
Yi! =a+ ¿f35DHSt + ¿8"DDht +Uit 
5;2 h;2 
z 




Parameters /1s and 5¡¡ represent the mean coefficients for the 25 firms in each subsample when 
controlling for the dynamic time series features of each stock's liquidity measure. Equations 
(10.1 )-(1 0.2) are estimated with a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the system of 
equations is estimated by Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The variance for each cross-
section and White's heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimates are then obtained from 
the OLS residuals. In the second stage, the GLS estimation of equation (10.1), using the 
variance-covariance matrix obtained in the first stage, is performed by iterating until 
convergence is reached. 13=(/12, ... ,137), 0=(02, ... ,05) and a are the coefficients of the model 
(10.1). a captures the Monday and the first half-hour of the session effects. Empirical results 
are summarized in Table 3. 
lO Given the past empírical evidence about daily regular pattems in financial time series, we also introduce daily 
durnmies in the regression equation, although hour analysis is focused on the irItraday regularities. 
II We start with a long autoregressive structure and progressively reduce the number of unnecessary 
autoregressive terms. 
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[Insert Table 3 around here] 
The liquidity measures considered show significant intraday regularities. Immediacy costs 
measures exhibit the usual regular pattems. For the MFTS, the relative spread (RSWT) 
follows a reversed J-shaped intraday pattem, dropping to its minimum around the central 
hours ofthe session (see Figure 1a).12 The effective spread (EFSWV) also tends to be greater 
at the initial and final periods of the session. This U-shaped pattem persists if we do not 
control for trading volume, though it is les s pronounced. Given that more than 90% of trades 
that obtained price improvements had an effective spread equal to zero (the trade price was 
equal to the midpoint), Figure 1 b suggests that the probability of observing a price 
improvement decreases with trade size. Therefore, large trades are normally associated with a 
larger effective spread. Table 4 reports the results of testing this hypothesis. IndependentIy of 
the hour of the session or day of the week considered, the median volume for trades inside the 
quoted bid-ask spread is significantIy lower than for trades at the quoted bid or ask. Moreover, 
the size of trades inside the quotes is not statistically different between hourly and daily 
intervals. Therefore, if informed traders are expected to participate in large volume trades 
(e.g. Easley and O'Rara, 1987), it should be concluded that either they do not generally obtain 
better prices than those quoted by the specialist or they prefer to submit 'at-the-quote' limit 
orders. Table 4 also shows that the median percentage of transactions inside the quoted bid-
ask spread is greater at the extreme periods of the session, but it achieves its maximum at the 
beginning of the trading day. For the LFTS immediacy costs measures regularly decrease 
along the session except for the EFSWV. 
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 4 around here] 
Quoted depth (DWT) progressively increases from the beginning of the session till the last 
two trading hours and then smoothly decreases (see Figure 2a). We have observed that the 
final regular decrease in depth is mainly due to the bid side. In fact, depth at the ask achieves 
its highest regular value at the last trading hour. 13 WVNET also increases from the first 
trading hour, however, it begins to decrease earlier and finally jumps to higher levels in the 
last trading hour (see figure 2b). In general terms, these pattems show that the quantity that 
12 When the relative spread is not weighted by time but constructed using the last quoted prices for each trading 
hour, it shows a U-shaped pattem. 
13 Harris (1989) and McInish and Wood (1990a) reported an increase in the proportion of trades at the ask 
relative to trades at the bid. The aboye pattems seem to be consistent with their fmdings. 
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can be traded without altering the quoted prices is lower during the first trading hours than 
during the rest of the session. Additional1y, if we consider the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask 
spread as a proxy for the underlying value of the stock, regular pattems for WVNET could 
give new insights about regular market expectations conceming the presence of information-
motivated trades. Thus, the fact that WVNET is systematically larger during the last trading 
hour may indicate that trading activity during this interval is related more closely to other 
motivations than to informed trading, making it more difficult to observe changes in the 
quoted midpoint. During the first trading hours, however, the quoted midpoint is more 
sensitive to order flow, suggesting a higher expected information-motivated activity. A 
comparative study of the characteristics involving changes in midpoint shows sorne 
significant and interesting differences between the first and the last trading hour for both 
subsamples: (a) the magnitude of changes is larger, (b) time between consecutive changes is 
shorter, (c) the number of trades required to provoke a change is lower, and (d) the mean 
volume per trade is larger for the MFTS and no significant1y different for the LFTS. For the 
LFTS quoted depth systematically increases towards the end ofthe day. As in the MFTS case, 
quoted depth at the ask and bid follow different regular pattems in the last trading hour. 
Comparative analysis of the aboye pattems allows us to establish that the largest change in 
liquidity happens between the first and the second trading interval for both subsamples. For 
the MFTS liquidity improvement persists, at least, up to the 13:00-14:00 interval. Finally, 
quoted liquidity deteriorates towards the end of the session. BLM captures the pattem 
predicted aboye: liquidity increases along the session, achieving its maximum at the interval 
14:00-15:00, and finally decreases but never below the initial values. For the LFTS, however, 
BLM unexpectedly declines towards the end of the trading session. Although quoted depth 
increases, once mean trade size is taken into account, the relative depth decreases for this 
subsample, indicating that the increase in depth does not offset the increase in activity during 
these last trading intervals. Figure 3 shows the intraday regular evolution of the BLM. 
Observe that the difference between the first time interval and the rest of the session is larger 
for the MFTS. This could reflect a higher success rate of specialists in avoiding large changes 
in liquidity in thinly traded stocks (see Madhavan and Sofianos, 1998).14 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
14 As regards daily regularities, Foster and Viswanathan (1993) for the NYSE, Lehman and Modest (1994) for 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and Rubio and Tapia (1996) for the Spanish Stock Exchange, among others, have 
reported larger immediacy costs in Mondays than in other days of the week. We only obtain evidence supporting 
this for the LFTS sample. In any case, daily regularities are no longer consistent when we control for firm size. 
14 
Two questions anse at this point: why does liquidity show the aforementioned regular 
behavior and why do we observe different regular pattems for MFTS and LFTS. Our intuition 
is that intraday fluctuations in market making costs might be behind the observed regular 
pattems in liquidity. The regular pattem reported for the price impact in Table 3 suggests that 
liquidity traders do not expect informed traders' activity to be uniformly distributed over the 
session both for MFTS and LFTS (as in Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). New information 
accumulated during the ovemight period and the short-lived advantage of informed traders, 
may increase the information asymmetry risk during the early hourly intervals. Therefore, for 
both MFTS and LFTS, the price impact of trades (PIWV) is greater during the first two 
intervals of the trading day than during the rest of the session and, hence, the mean profits of 
market making net of losses with informed traders are lowest. However, both price discovery 
process and the increased confidence on prior beliefs about the fundamental value ofthe stock 
should progressively reduce initial information asymmetries as the session advances (as in 
Foster and Viswanathan, 1990). Moreover, if new information is produced during trading 
periods, trades based on it may be delayed till the last trading hours because of the larger 
depth and, as we will see later on, the increased trading activity during these last trading 
periods. This would allow informed agents to trade more at the same price and to hide their 
trades among large liquidity-motivated trades. In addition, inventory costs should increase as 
we get close to the end of the session because of the risk of carrying undesired inventory 
ovemight. Consistently, Table 5 -panel A- evidences that the highest adverse selection costs, 
computed as the ratio of the price impact to the half-effective spread for each trade, occur 
during the first two time intervals and decrease progressively towards the end of the trading 
day.15 Moreover, the percentage of adverse selection costs is lower for the LFTS 
independently ofthe trading hour, which intuitively agrees with inventory holding costs being 
more important for those stocks that are les s traded. 
For the MFTS the price impact increases from the 13:00-14:00 time interval, but this upward 
trend is broken in the last trading hour. When volume per trade is not taken into account, 
however, this last jump disappears and the unweighted price impact follows a reversed J-
shaped pattem (see Figure 4). Similar pattems arise when prices are used as post-trade values, 
also for the LFTS. Figure 4 shows that large trades have a larger price impact, but it also 
reveals that large trades in the last trading interval are less informative for the market than 
large trades in other time intervals. We have tested this hypothesis by grouping trades in five 
15 This result is independent ofthe proxy used for the post-trade theoretica1 va1ue ofthe stock. 
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trade size-based quintiles. 16 Table 5 -panel B- shows first that there is generally an increasing 
trade-size effect independently of the trading hour considered. Paired tests (not reported) also 
display positive and significant differences between the largest and the smallest quintiles. 
Second, similar trades at different trading hours have significantly different effects on price, 
and this result is independent of the quintile considered. Finally, paired tests indicate that the 
price impact of any trade at the beginning of the trading day is significantly larger than that of 
a similar trade at the end ofthe trading day. Therefore, expectations about the informativeness 
of trades seem to move the market. Trades are expected to be more information motivated at 
the beginning of the trading day. This causes any trade to have a larger price impact than a 
similar trade towards the end ofthe session, independently ofits size. 
[Insert Figure 4 and Table 5 around here] 
Summarizing, the evidence aboye seems to indicate that the reported intraday regular pattems 
in globalliquidity may be explained (at least partially) by expectations about when informed 
trading is more intense or when information asymmetries are larger. These generally extended 
expectations determine the expected informativeness of trades and, in general, the sensitivity 
of the midpoint to the order flow. This argument also suggest that the market may interpret 
similar market conditions at different hour1y intervals as being caused by distinct reasons. 
Market conditions are analyzed in the next section. 
5. - Market conditions and liquidity. 
If liquidity providers were risk adverse agents, liquidity should be expected to deteriorate 
during periods of higher maker making costs. Because market conditions should be related to 
the magnitude of the different costs of market making, theoretical and empirical studies have 
pointed out that variables like activity, volatility, level of private information, off-competition 
and institutional restrictions are all influential in determining the quoted bid-ask spread (e.g., 
McInish and Wood, 1992). There is, however, 1itt1e empirica1 evidence and few theoretica1 
predictions about how changes in market conditions explain depth. The logical and usual 
c1aim is that, by extension, the effects on depth shou1d be the opposite of those predicted on 
immediacy costs (e.g., Engle and Lange, 1997; Kavajecz, 1998). 
The expected effect of activity on liquidity in a time series context is an open empirical 
question. Greater activity is associated with 10wer inventory-holding costs given that higher 
16 Each quintile has the same number of trades. 
16 
levels of activity should allow a faster return to desired optimal portfolios (e.g., Easley et al., 
1996). On the one hand, as soon as there are economies of scale in order-processing costs, a 
higher 1evel of activity will reduce immediacy costs (see G10sten and Harris 1988).17 
However, the effect of activity in adverse selection costs is uncertain. In Kyle (1985), Admati 
and Ptleiderer (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1993), periods oflower time between trades were 
due to liquidity motivated trade c1ustering. Furthermore, in Eas1ey and O'Hara (1992) more 
time between trades was interpreted as a signal of no new information. Globally, volatility is 
expected to reduce liquidity. Because of greater uncertainty about the true value of stock, 
price volatility is positively related with holding risk and also with information asymmetry 
risk (e.g., Tinic and West, 1972; French and Roll, 1986). ConsequentIy, the higher the 
volatility the greater the immediacy costs and the lower the depth (e.g., Cohen et al., 1981; 
Copeland and Galai, 1983; O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986; Foster and Viswanathan, 1990). 
Informed trading is expected to reduce liquidity due to both larger immediacy costs (e.g., 
Bagehot, 1971; Glosten y Milgrom, 1985) and smaller depth (e.g., Kyle, 1985; Engle and 
Lange, 1997; Kluger and Stephan., 1997). However, competition among informed traders 
may increase the informativeness of trades and finally increase depth (see Subrahmanyam 
1991; Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992). The effect of off-competition in liquidity is 
doubtful. More intense external competition has been shown to bring about narrower quoted 
spreads (e.g., Copeland and Galai 1983; Ahn et al. 1995, and Madhavan and Sofianos 1998). 
However, the impact of external competition on depth has received little attention. Quoted 
depth may be lower during periods of more intense external competition simply because less 
trading is demanded from the NYSE (e.g., Harris, 1994). Moreover, competing through depth 
would only attract more informed trading due to the possibility of trading larger orders. 
Therefore we expect off-competition to reduce depth. Recently, it has also been shown that 
regional markets attract an important part of their trades not through better prices but through 
payment for order tlow, and that there is a successful 'cream skimming' ofuninformed orders 
by off-NYSE market makers (see Blume and Glostein, 1997; Bessembinder and Kaufman, 
1997). If the cream skimming effect matters for liquidity, its effect will be negative. Finally, 
the minimum price variation or tick imposes a minimum value on the quoted bid-ask spread. 
If the quoted spread is larger than it would be in case of setting a smaller tick, market 
microstructure will be restricting liquidity (e.g., Ahn et al., 1995; Bessembinder, 1997). Harris 
(1994) suggested that when liquidity providers could not increase liquidity through a narrower 
spread because of the tick, liquidity would be improved through greater quoted depth. It is 
17 Economies of scale are possible given that, as we will see later on, high activity periods are strongly linked 
with larger trades. If, as hypothesized, order-processing costs are constant, this implies the possibility of sharing 
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therefore expected that quoted depth will increase in periods ofhigh tick restriction. 
Market determinants are defined in the foHowing way: volume (VOL) and trading frequency 
(TFREC) are measured by the square root of the accumulated trading volume and the square 
root of mean time between transactions (in seconds) respectively.18 Volatility (RISK) is 
defined as the deviation of the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread for each period t with 
respect to its median, weighted by time. Informed trading (INF) is approximated using an 
unexpected trade-size measure, defined as the standardized square root of the mean volume 
per transaction. 19 Standardization is performed by subtracting from each observation 
associated with a day (d=1, ... ,5) and hour (h=1, ... ,7) of the week, the median of aH 
observations corresponding to this particular hour and day, and then dividing it by the 
standard deviation ofthis median (see Appendix B). Off-competition (COMP) is measured by 
the ratio of share volume traded at the regional markets and NASD to share volume traded at 
the NYSE. Finally, the tick restriction (TICK) is computed as the percentage of time that the 
quoted spread equals the tick ($118 for aH firms in the sample). 
5.1. - Intraday regularities in market conditions. 
With the same methodology previously described for liquidity measures, we study regular 
intraday pattems in market variables and compare them with the regular pattems previously 
found for liquidity. Results are summarized in Table 6. VOL and RISK follow the familiar 
reversed J-shaped pattem that denotes larger levels of activity and volatility at the beginning 
and towards the end of sessions.20 Regular pattems for TFREC show that time between trades 
is lower during the first two and the last two hours of the trading day. Moreover, mean 
volume per trade (not reported) is larger in the initial and final hourIy time intervals. 
Therefore, although market conditions in terms of activity, volatility and trade size are more 
similar at the extreme periods of the trading session, there are large differences in liquidity 
behavior during these periods, which suggests that similar market conditions at different 
moments of the trading session may be assumed to be caused by different reasons. 
these fixed costs among a larger number of units of stock. 
18 These transformations are used to smooth the series and reduce the effect of outliers in the regressions. 
19 Informed traders are assumed to be impatient agents because their private information becomes less valuable 
over time. Therefore, they are expected to trade more aggressively (see Foster and Viswanathan, 1990) before 
their private information becomes public1y known. Unexpected trading volume could be used as a proxy for the 
intensity of informed trading (e.g., Black, 1971; Easley and Q'Hara, 1987) because large trades 'convey more 
information than small trades' (Hasbrouck, 1988, pg. 229). 
20 Intraday pattems in volume aml/or volatility were also evidenced by Mclnish and Wood (1985), Harris (1986), 
Jain and Joh (1988), Mclnish and Wood (1990), McInish and Wood (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and 
Lee et al. (1993) for the NYSE, McInish and Wood (1990b) for the Toronto Stock Exchange, Lehman and 
Modest (1994) for the Tokyo Stock Exchange and Biais et al. (1995) for the Paris Bourse, among others. 
18 
Nevertheless, these regularities are consistent with our previous intuition in the following 
sense: liquidity providers expect a higher probability of informed-motivated trading during 
the first hours of the session. The higher activity is thought to hide impatient informed traders, 
and the lower time between trades is also interpreted as a sign of new information arriving to 
the market (as in Easley and O'Hara, 1992). Uncertainty generated about the value of the 
stock is reflected in higher levels of volatility. As the session advances information 
asymmetry risk falls, prices stabilize, volume decreases, and the time between trades 
increases. As closing comes near, portfolio-adjustment needs increase volume and trading 
frequency. Higher inventory-holding risk makes liquidity providers reduce depth and increase 
irnmediacy costs again. Traders are disposed to trade larger amounts at any price, increasing 
volatility. In any case, the volume needed to move the midpoint is larger because of the lower 
expected probability oftrading with better informed traders (notice the lowest regular pattems 
in INF during the last trading hour). Finally, if the cream skimming negatively affected 
liquidity, its effect would be regularly lower during the last trading hours. For the LFTS, the 
worsening of liquidity during the last trading hours seems coherent with market makers 
protecting themselves from higher inventory-holding risks. 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
5.2. - Liquidity adjustments to changes in market conditions. 
This section deals with the question of how liquidity behaves in altemative market scenarios, 
and investigates whether liquidity reactions to changing market conditions are only the 
consequence of automatic adjustments to the previously reported regular pattems in market 
indicators. Special attention is paid to the identification of those market variables that have an 
unambiguous effect on liquidity, in the sense that they are linked to immediacy costs and 
depth in opposite ways. Finally, studying their relationship with the mean price impact of 
trades identifies variables that indicate greater informational content of trades. As a first 
approximation, following Lee et al. (1993), each liquidity measure is regressed on each of our 
explanatory market variables, using the same pool generalized least square (GLS) regression 
procedure described in section 3, now applied to equation (11) (where Xt represents sorne 
market determinant). Table 7, panel A, reports the estimated f3 coefficients that were 
significant at the 5% level. 
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[Insert Table 7 around here] 
Only volatility has an unambiguous effect on liquidity for both subsamples. High volatility 
periods are linked with high immediacy costs and reduced depth. Moreover, for the MFTS 
depth increases due to the impossibility of improving liquidity through narrower spreads, 
consistent with Harris (1994). For the LFTS, however, quoted depth decreases with TICK. In 
any case, tick restriction for the latter subsample is significantly lower (26% of time for the 
LFTS versus 69% for the MFTS in median terms). Consistent with adverse selection costs' 
arguments, immediacy costs grow with activity and with unexpected trade size. VOL and 
INF, however, are also significantly linked to larger quoted and realized depth. 2I Therefore, 
although specialists increase spreads in order to offset greater market making costs, at these 
worse quotes liquidity providers are willing to offer more quantity to be traded. Finally, 
although higher off-competition reduces immediacy costs, it also reduces depth (as expected). 
Hence, the effect of these last measures on liquidity is uncertain. These preliminary results 
also indicate that trades have a larger price impact during periods ofhigher activity (measured 
by either VOL or TFREC), higher volatility and larger unexpected trade-size. Hence, these 
market variables may indicate higher informational content oftrades. 
Results for BLM indicate that: (a) VOL and lower time between trades affect liquidity 
negatively. This result conforms to models that interpret higher activity as more adverse 
selection and inventory costs of market making (e.g., Foster and Viswanathan, 1993). 
Agreeing with Easley and O'Hara (1992) longer periods without trades are interpreted as no 
new information allowing liquidity providers to increase liquidity. (b) BLM decreases with 
RISK. Price uncertainty, because of either adverse selection costs (e.g. French and Roll, 1985) 
or inventory holding costs (e.g., O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986), leads risk averse liquidity 
providers to reduce liquidity. (c) Off-competition positively affects liquidity for MFTS. This 
result does not support the cream skimming effect as being relevant for liquidity. Ifthis effect 
were important, days with greater competition from external markets should increase the risk 
of informed trading at the NYSE and greater price impact of trades should be expected. 
RecentIy, Battalio (1997) has shown, for a sample ofNYSE-listed securities, that the adverse 
21 TFREC is also inversely related with WVNET 
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selection costs associated with the action of cream skimmers may be economicaHy 
insignificant. Our results also suggest the possibility that informed traders adjust their trades 
to the lower liquidity-motivated trading volume during periods of higher off-competition in 
order to remain in hiding. (d) BLM is greater when TICK is larger. This result also supports 
the idea that lower minimum price variations would favor liquidity improvements (e.g., 
Harris, 1994). Finally, (e) our proxy for informed trading activity is positively related to BLM 
in both subsamples. During periods of large unexpected mean trade size the reported increase 
in depth is relatively larger than the corresponding change in immediacy costs.22 
In order to analyze whether these relationships are mainly due to the regular pattems 
previously reported, we have estimated equation (11) for each liquidity measure and each 
market determinant but have added the dummy variables that control for trading hour and 
trading day. Those coefficients that are not longer significant at the 5% level are marked with 
an asterisk in Table 7, Panel A. Only one aspect is remarkable: when price improvements are 
considered, immediacy costs for the MFTS seems to automatically adjust to the predictable 
regular changes in activity. If these regular pattems are discounted, there is no additional 
relationship between activity and effective spread. Therefore, results show that liquidity 
adjusts to changes (either regular or irregular) in market conditions. However, only volatility 
is linked with opposite changes in immediacy costs and depth for both subsamples. Moreover, 
market activity and volatility provide signals about greater information asymmetry risk that 
increases the mean price impact oftrades. 
It has already been shown that sorne market variables show similar regular pattems. Liquidity 
providers can also interpret many of these market indicators as a signal of informed trading 
activity. Moreover, there are high correlations between sorne of these variables, especially for 
the LFTS sample.23 AH this suggests that crossed effects due to other variables could bias 
previous simple regression results. Equation (12) is estimated, using again the pooled GLS 
regression procedure, to account for these crossed effects. Although the model is linear in the 
parameters, for sorne liquidity measures the functional form may differ. A preliminary 
analysis showed that sorne relationships were better captured by non-linear specifications. In 
sorne cases, however, non-linearities might be induced by the presence of outliers. Moreover, 
highest correlations between the explanatory variables might cause problems of 
22 For those market variables that, given their relationship with immediacy costs and depth, do not have an 
unequivocal effect on liquidity, BLM captures which liquidity dimension they are more strongly linked too For 
example, for the MFTS sample, INF explains a larger part of the total variability of the quoted depth than that of 
the relative spread. The opposite happens with VOL and COMP. 
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multicollinearity. We have, therefore, analyzed several models, both linear and non-linear, 
concerned with the market variables. The paper reports the estimated model that was 
ultimately chosen.24,25 
z 
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Table 7, Panel B, summarizes the regression results for the variables that measure immediacy 
costs or depth. In aH cases, the selected specifications were linear. Again, only volatility has 
opposite effect on immediacy costs and depth dimensions for both subsamples. Several joint 
effects between the explanatory variables were observed.26 For the MFTS sample VOL and 
COMP do not explain immediacy costs and quoted depth anyrnore, the effective spread only 
depends on RISK and INF, and TFREC now has an unambiguous effect on depth. For the 
LFTS sample the main change is observed for TFREC, which seems to increase immediacy 
costs once the effect of other market indicators has been considered.27 Equations (13) and (14) 
represent the pooled coefficient estimates for the price impact for both subsamples.28 
Adjusted-R2 are 0.1988 and 0.5203 respectively. Once again volatility, activity and trade-size 
(when significant) are coupled with higher mean price impact of trades. Therefore, the market 
seems to interpret more active and volatile periods as times where there is more information 
arriving at the market. In contrast, stronger off-competition and high persistence of the 
minimum quoted spreads reduce the expected informational content of trades. Whether or not 
off-competition is based on payment for order flow, or whether or not the cream skimming 
effect exists, higher external competition does not increases the impact of trades. 
23 Highest correlations are among VOL, TFREC and INF. 
24 Non-linear specifications are considered only when they provide a better interpretation of the estimated 
relationship. Therefore, whenever it is possible, we choose linear models. 
25 Results for the LFTS should be taken with care since missing observations are common for sorne liquidity 
measures and market indicators. Effective spread and price impact, for example, are not defined when there are 
no trades. 
26 In fact TFREC and VOL seem to capture the same aspect of market activity for these liquidity measures. 
When both market variables are considered together VOL is not significant. When only one of them is included 
in the regression, its coefficient is ful1y significant at the 5% level and, in both cases, it gives the same intuition 
about how activity influences on liquidity. This is a typical multicollinearity effect. 
27 Given that it is common for these LFTS to observe periods without trades, there is not reason to expect special 
behavior of liquidity around periods of scarce trading. Therefore, the rational in Easley and O'Hara (1992) may 
be not valid for these type of stocks, and we could be facing a spurious relationship. It is also possible that we 
are simply dealing with a scale factor since greater volume reduces liquidity but this effect is reduced when the 
volume is shared between a larger number oftrades. 
28 Autoregressive terrns have be en omitted. 
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+(.0029 )1nfit -(.0097 )Tickit -(.0032)ComPit + u¡t 
PIWv¡{FTS = (.0402) - (.0012 )TFrecit + (l. 81e-05 )TFrec{¡ + (.4578 )Risk¡t + 
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(14) 
FinalIy, equations (15) and (16) show the pooled estimates ofthe BLM model. Adjusted R2 
are 0.4346 and 0.5542 respectively. Observe that off-competition does not influence liquidity 
once the effect of other market indicators has been discounted. Mainly, three variables seem 
to influence BLM for both subsamples: VOL and RISK are linked to 10wer quoted liquidity, 
consistently with the simple regression results and with the previously reported regular 
pattems. The negative effect of VOL is due to the larger impact this variable has on 
immediacy costs than on quoted depth. TICK coexists with higher BLM values. For the 
MFTS, both quoted and realized depths grow during periods of high tick incidence. These 
results do not suffer significant changes once regular pattems are taken into account. 
Therefore, liquidity reacts to changes in market conditions more than is expected by 
automatic adjustments to the regular changes in the market conditions. 
BLMi~FTS =(.6324)-(.00083)Volit -(.8302)Riskit + (.J236)In/;t + (l.0594)Tickit +uit (15) 
BLMi;FTS = (.9751) - (0033 )Volit - (0006 )TFrecit - (1.3469 )Riskit + (3969 )Tickit + Uit (16) 
In summary, liquidity adjusts to contemporaneous changes in market conditions. After 
controlling for the predictable changes in market variables, there is still a significant 
relationship between liquidity and market conditions. Activity and volatility tend to worsen 
quoted liquidity. For the MFTS, high tick persistence induces 1iquidity improvements through 
quoted and realized depth and off-competition does not affect liquidity once other market 
indicators are considered. When we study irnmediacy costs and depth separately, only 
volatility has an opposite effect on both liquidity dimensions for the two subsamples. For the 
other market variables, results for BLM indicate which liquidity dimension they are more 
strongly connected to (in terms of how much of the total variability of immediacy costs and 
depth they explain). Finally, more activity, unexpected trade size and volatility are signals of 
greater informational content of trades. More off-competition and persistence of the minimum 
quoted spreads reduce the impact of trades in prices. 
6. - Surnrnary and discussion. 
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Using intraday data from the NYSE, this paper has extended previous time series analysis of 
liquidity by a simultaneous analysis of immediacy costs and sensitivity of prices to order 
flow. As a first approximation to the multidimensional characterization ofliquidity, a new and 
simple direct measure has been introduced, the Bidimensional Liquidity Measure (BLM), that 
captures simultaneous changes in both immediacy costs and depth. Significant intraday 
regular pattems for liquidity are obtained. These pattems suggest that liquidity progressively 
increases along the session and only deteriorates towards the end of the trading day. It is 
hypothesized that regularities in liquidity are mainly due to the intraday fluctuations in 
different market making costs. Using the price impact of trades as a proxy for adverse 
selection costs of market making, it is evidenced that liquidity traders do not expect infonned 
traders' activity to be uniformly distributed throughout the session. Price impact of trades is 
systematically larger the first two trading hours. Significant differences between the first and 
the last trading hours are reported which suggest an increasing importance of inventory-
holding costs towards the end ofthe session. Moreover, the percentage ofthe effective spread 
due to adverse selection costs declines over the day. In fact, although trade size is shown to 
matter, aH trades at the beginning of the day and independently of their size have a higher 
probability ofbeing considered as infonnation motivated than similar trades during the rest of 
the session. 
Liquidity is also shown to react to changing market conditions, and these adjustments are 
larger than expected from the predictable changes in market conditions. Only volatility, 
however, is shown to have an unambiguous effect on liquidity. Our Bidimensional Liquidity 
Measure indicates that higher activity and volatility reduce quoted liquidity. No significant 
effect due to off-competition is found afier controlling for other market indicators. Therefore, 
if the cream skimming exists, it is irrelevant for liquidity. Finally, more activity, trade size 
and volatility are found to be indicators of new infonnation arriving to the market, which 
increases the mean price impact of trades. In contrast, greater off-competition and more 
persistence of minimum quotable spreads are associated with lower infonnational content of 
trades. 
These results suggest important lines for both theoretical and empirical future research. 
Liquidity at least requires a bidimensional characterization based on immediacy costs and 
depth. However, these two dimensions are not independent. Theoretical models that 
simultaneously analyze both dimensions of liquidity are required. The main problem of those 
models will be to set the main detenninants of the depth dimension of liquidity. This paper 
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has shown that, a1though immediacy costs and depth are negative1y related, only volatility 
seems to induce changes compatible with this negative relationship. Moreover, trading 
activity measured either by volume or trading frequency is found to better explain the 
evolution of immediacy costs than that of depth. Therefore, the identification of the main 
determinants of the sensitivity of prices to order flow requires further attention. In any case, 
the TAQ database does not allow us to distinguish between the part of the quoted depth that 
corresponds to the specialist and the part that reflects the limit order book. The motivations of 
the specialist may differ from those of other liquidity providers (e.g., Kavajecz, 1998). Future 
empirical studies are required to analyze how market conditions affect to that part of the 
quoted depth that corresponds to different liquidity providers. 
A further relevant implication of this paper is that liquidity is also moved by expectations 
about the timing ofthe information arrivals at the market. Liquidity traders are expected to act 
with higher probability at the beginning of the trading day, and this increases adverse 
selection costs during these periods. However, although market conditions in terms of 
volume, volatility, trading frequency and trade size are similar, trades at the end ofthe day are 
considered as more likely to be caused by portfolio adjustments or other non information-
motivated reasons. These elements will increase the relevance of inventory-holding costs 
during the last trading hours. Hence, the dynamics of liquidity and the reaction to changing 
market conditions are expected to differ at different trading hours. This paper evidences a 
mean relationship between market conditions and liquidity during the trading day that may 
differ at different moments of the session. 
Finally, the use of multimensionalliquidity measures may help to extend past time series and 
cross-sectional empirical analysis. Simple as it is, BLM gives sorne intuitions about the 
behavior of liquidity that cannot be captured studying immediacy costs and depth dimensions 
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Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of sorne statistics for both subsamples: the 
more frequently traded stocks (MFTS) and the less frequently traded stocks (LFTS). 
General statistics 
Issue Details MFTS LFTS 
Daily trades 231.2 (199.6) 6.7 (2.6) 
Daily share volume 594,846 (496,305) 12,356 (8,579) 
Trades placement (%) ¡nside quotes 24.4 (7.9) 24.6 (8.5) 
Atthe ask 38.4 (4.1) 35.7 (5.4) 
At thebid 36.1 (5.0) 37.5 (7.9) 
Not classified' 1.1 (0.4) 2.3 (1.6) 
Tick restriction (%) Spread=tick 61.9 (15.6) 42.5 (23.7) 
Spread=2*tick 33.2 (10.1) 41.4 (14.7) 
Spread>2*tick 4.9 (6.8) 16.1(11.2) 
Quote changes after a trade Quotes revised 42.2 (15) 58.5 (9.4) 
at the ask (1) Ask rises 29 (8.6) 28.7 (8.4) 
(2) Bid rises 2.7 (1.6) 3.2 (1.5) 
(3) Ask and bid rise 7.5 (4.2) 23.2 (11.7) 
(4) Other 3.0 (1.6) 3.3 (1.5) 
Quote changes after a trade Quotes revised 44 (16) 56 (21.4) 
at the bid (1) Ask falls 3.2 (1.8) 3 (1.1) 
(2) Bid falls 30(9.1) 27.2 (9.9) 
(3) Ask and bid fall 7.7 (4.7) 22.4 (12.2) 
(4) Other 3.1 (1.1) 3.5 (1.3) 
Adverse selectÍon cost- Unweighted 53.1 (17.3) 62.1 (23.7) 
component (%) ofthe Weighted (volume) 74.8 (17.2) 65.3 (22.2) 
spread 
Hourly statistics: one-dimensionalliquidity measures and market variables 
Issue MFTS LFTS 
Relative spread weighted by time .0049 (.0031) .0178 (.0151) 
Effective spread weighted by volume .1269 (.0462) .1592 (.1055) 
Price impact weighted by volume .0526 (.0575) .0495 (.0847) 
Realized spread weighted by volume .0111 (.06 I 8) .0504 (. I 933) 
Implicit spread .0035 (.0023) .0526 (.0341) 
Quoted depth weighted by time 22,884 (24,340) 8,511 (13,240) 
VNET 7,738 (17,016) 2,745 (6,750) 
Share volume 95,591 (153,260) 1,998 (16,803) 
Trading frequency (seconds between trades) 221.175 (381.279) 2,480 (12,714) 
Volatility (quoted midpoint) .0949 (.0984) .0235 (.0461) 
Volume per trade 2,155 (452) 299 (585) 
Unexpected volume per trade .15 (.9887) .3131 (.9497) 
Tick restriction (% oftime) .6388 (.2846) .4099 (.4539) 
Off-competition (% over NYSE volume) .3844 (.3417) .1047 (.4226) 




Results of a non-parametric test of independence based on contingency tables. Each hourly interval is classified into one of four 
categories depending on whether the value for each variable is higher or lower than its respective median. Observations in which any 
of the variables equals its median are not considered (they are, in any case, negligible). The contingency table for each pair of 
measures is reported. Values in parenthesis represent the expected numbers in each category, under the null hypothesis of 
independence. Categories are (from the upper-Ieft cell to the lower-right cell): below-be1ow, below-above, above-below and above-
aboye. For each contingency table the value for the Pearson Chi-square test, the direction ofthe dependency, its significance level and 
the percentage of stocks for which independence is individually rejected, are also given. Direction of dependency is positive (+) when 
both measures are simultaneously aboye and below their respective medians on more occasions than expected. lt is negative (-) when 
measures are in opposite categories on more occasions than expected. Results correspond to the more frequently traded stocks (MFTS) 
subsample. 
RSWT EFSWV PIWV DWT WVNET 





PIWV 12118 9708 11396 9779 
(10909) (10917) (10406) (10769) 
9708 12134 9347 11627 
(10917) (10925) (10337) (10637) 
X'=535.53 (+,···,80) X'=37 1.96 (+,·",80) 
DWT 9955 12251 9973 11396 10060 11784 
(11108) (1 1098) (10746) (10623) (10924) (10920) 
12263 9945 11220 9591 11790 10058 
(11110) (11098) (10337) (10364) (10926) (10922) 
X2=479.32 (-,"·,80) X2=226.91 (-,"·,72) X2=273.36 (-,"·,76) 
WVNET 9645 10530 9688 10308 10492 9672 13646 6530 
(10084) (10091 ) (9974) (10022) (10080) (10084) (10089) (10087) 
10519 9648 10267 9743 9664 10491 6526 13640 
(10080) (10087) (9987) (10029) (10076) (10079) (10083) (10083) 
X2=76.43 (-,*··,76) /=32.73 (-,***,36) X2=67.27 (+,*** ,48) X'=5019 (+,***,100) 
BLM 7237 13055 9329 \0081 8998 10983 16917 3382 11837 6616 
(10150) (\0142) (9973.7) (9436.3) (9989.5) (9991.5) (10151) (10148) (9226.5) (9226.5) 
13060 7228 10026 8427 10979 8998 3381 16912 6615 11836 
(10147) (10141) (938\.3) (9071.7) (9987.5) (9989.5) (10147) (10146) (9225.5) (9225.5) 
X'=3344.6 (-,·**,96) X'=175.81 (-,***,76) X'= 393.64 (-,***,84) X'=18047 X2=2954 
(+,***,100) (+,***,\00) 
*** Slgnlficant at the 1 % leve!. 
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TABLE3 
Liquidity measures. Intraday regular effects. 
For each measure analyzed, equation (TI) has been estimated using Pooled GLS with White's standard errors (robust to 
general heteroskedasticity within each cross-section unit). We also control for different heteroskedasticity across cross-
sections. In order to account for residual autocorrelation within cross-sections, an autoregressive structure is aIlowed on 
residuals. t 
, 5 
Yu = a + I.J3,DHs, + I 0hDDh, + Uu 
$=2 h=l 
Ui, = ÍrkUj(f-k) + e,., 
1e=1 
(TI) 
i represents the stock (the cross-sectional unit) and t the hour (i=1, ... ,25; t=1,2, ... ,1778). DHs, (for s=2 to 7) are dummy 
variables that take the value I for the sth hour ofthe session and zero otherwise. DDh, (for h = 2 to 5) are dummy variables 
that take the value I for the hth trading day of the week and zero otherwise. &;, is the error terrn, such that E[li'li]=n. P' = 
(PJ ..... P,), 0'= (OJ •... , 05), y' = (YI ..... yJ and a are the coefficients ofthe model. a captures the Monday and the first half-
hour ofthe session effects. The coefficients oofthe daily dummies and yofthe autoregressive terrns are omitted. 
MFTS = more frequently traded stocks, LFTS = less frequently traded stocks. For definitions of RSWT, EFSWV, PIWV, 
DWT, WVNET and BLM see appendix B and equation (9). 
Panel A: MFfS 
Measure 
Coefficient RSWT EFSWV PIWV DWT WVNET BLM 
Intercept .003324* .124236* .050467* 6639.146* 3600.194* .538485* 
[10:00 II :00) -.000296* -.003018* -.002065* 2588.952* 905.44* .474850* 
[11:00 12:00) -.000390* -.003463* -.007639* 3924.257* 1289.834* .695414* 
[12:0013:00) -.000419* -.005155* -.011484* 4194.851 * 1274.229* .729171* 
[13:0014:00) -.000427* -.004569* -.010650* 4459.658* 1178.221 * .750943* 
[14:0015:00) -.000411 * -.003788* -.008651 * 4339.946* 883.7245* .833397* 
[15:0016:00] -.000368* 2.17e-05 -.010778* 4336.878* 1245.805* .646383* 
Adjusted R2• .7973 .3792 .0081 .4833 .0844 .4453 
Panel B: LFTS 
Measure 
Coefficient RSWT EFSWV PIWV DWT WVNETt BLM 
Intercept .013667* .135169* .043297* 2000.341 * 1063.215* .824493* 
[10:00 11:00) -.000401 * -.002105 -.001746* 168.3277* 116.1631 * .086243* 
[11 :00 12:00) -.000734* -.006092* -.002829* 275.1872* 102.4501 * .170664* 
[12:0013:00) -.000932* -.006267* -.004717* 315.9793* 168.5231 * .34381 * 
[13:00 14:00) -.001036* -.007436* -.004996* 345.7370* 141.5824* .315164* 
[14:0015:00) -.001119* -.007236* -.004311 * 369.1960* 157.0588* .239098* 
[15:0016:00] -.001151* -.006672* -.003483* 385.773* 204.9638* .149778* 
Adjusted Rl• .6664 .3651 .4647 .7615 .5726 
t The number of autoregressive terrns has been selected after rejecting more complex specifications, starting with z=7. 
: For this regression the R' is almost zero. 
* Significant (at least) at the 5% level. 
** Significant at the 10% level. 
• These R1 are mainly due to the autoregressive structure. 
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TABLE4 
Trades witb prices inside tbe quoted bid-ask spread 
Summary ofthe distribution oftrades with prices inside the quoted bid-ask spread (the quoted spread is assigned to the 
trade using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm). This inc1udes the median volume per inside-quote trade for each time 
interval considered. Final1y, it al so reports the difference with respect to the median volume per trade transacted for a 
trade with a price equal to the quoted bid or quoted ask. MFTS = more frequently traded stocks, LFTS = less 
frequentIy traded stocks. 
Median percentage(l) Median volume(2) Difference in median volume per 
of inside-quote trades per trade trade with trades at the quotes 
Period MFTS LFTS MFTS LFTS MFTS LFTS 
[9:3010:00) .2188 .2493 1972.90 1141.18 -1075.25* -451.68 
[10:0011:00) .1792 .1383 1875.99 903.06 -497.93* -374.01* 
[11:0012:00) .1317 .1296 1780.76 930.23 -450.16* -437.41* 
[12:0013:00) .1040 .1047 1890.81 667.57 -463.78** -326.72* 
[13:0014:00) .0943 .0994 1785.71 814.29 -479.32* -411.24* 
[14:0015:00) .1165 .1111 1720.52 872.22 -469.61* -363.89* 
[15:00 16:00] .1595 .1527 2030.31 842.86 -598.22* -362.77* 
Monday .1792 .1992 1770.85 687.90 -538.75* -488.27* 
Tuesday .2179 .2204 1980.61 968.18 -538.38* -311.98** 
Wednesday .2106 .1968 1814.06 1053.68 -646.72* -403.64** 
Thursday .1993 .1882 2052.12 921.43 -518.08* -227.27** 
Friday .1928 .1975 1849.85 848.33 -590.88* -440.67* 
O) Medians of MFTS and LFTS are statistical1y different at the 5% 1evel, using the Krustal-Wallis test for equality of 
medians (both for hours and days). 
(2) Medians ofMFTS and LFTS are not statistical1y different at the 5% 1evel, using the Krusta1-Wal1is test for equality 
of medians (both for hours and days). 
* Significant at the 5% leve!, using the Mann-Whitney W test for the equality of medians of two samples (altemative 
hypothesis: median volume of inside-quote trades is lower than median oftrades at quotes). 
** Significant at the 10% level, using the Mann-Whitney W test for the equality ofmedians oftwo samples (altemative 
hypothesis: median volume of inside-quote trades is lower than median volume oftrades at quotes). 
TABLES 
Adverse selection costs as a percentage of tbe effective spread. 
For each trade, the percentage of immediacy costs due to adverse selection costs is estimated using the ratio of price impact to half-effective 
spread. lmmediacy costs have been computed using both trade price and midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread as proxies for the post-trade 
theoretical value of the stock. Only the results for the midpoint are reported. Panel A contains mean values per hour. Panel B summarizes the 
results oftesting differences in price impact oftrades of equal size at different trading periods. The Mann-Whitney (Wi1coxon) W test is used 
to contrast equality ofmedians between each pair oftrading hours. Quintiles are sorted from the lowest to the larger trade size. MFTS = more 
frequently traded stocks, LFTS = less frequently traded stocks. 
Panel A 
MFTS* 
Hour: [9:30 10:00) [10:00 11 :00) [11 :00 12:00) [12:0013:00) [13:00 14:00) [14:0015:00) [15:0016:00] 
Adverse selection (%) 83.38 73.05 62.28 60.32 61.15 64.1 65.85 
LFTS* 
Hour: [9:30 10:00) [10:00 11 :00) [11 :00 12:00) [12:0013:00) [13:00 14:00) [14:0015:00) [15:0016:00] 
Adverse selection (%) 64.91 61.74 55.29 54.11 53.48 53.72 50.42 
Panel B 
MFTS 
Quintile [9:30 10:00) [10:00 11 :00) [11 :00 12:00) [12:0013:00) [13:0014:00) [14:00 15:00) [15:0016:00] First -last Total 
First* .0311065 .0212718 .0169762 .0155513 .0151677 .0164342 .0189206 .0121859 .0187178 
Second* .0399013 .0301375 .0234615 .0219143 .0235534 .0249796 .0279118 .0119895+ .0269625 
Third* .0533153 .0421973 .0332363 .0315645 .0335155 .0354256 .0369167 .0163987+ .0377163 
Fourth* .0651551 .0529607 .0421111 .042128 .0415075 .0448838 .047401 .0177541+ .0477843 
Fifth* .0678754 .0621512 .0551779 .0536864 .0526831 .0549097 .0568394 .0110361+ .0576A17 
LFTS 
Quintile [9:30 10:00) [10:00 11 :00) [11:00 12:00) [12:00 13:00) [13:0014:00) [14:0015:00) [15:0016:00] First -last Total 
First* .0442603 .0352504 .0262199 .0215188 .0271329 .0271043 .0213038 .0229566' .0297845 
Second* .0511807 .0425314 .0419551 .0305915 .0300812 .035627 .0290836 .0227571 + .0383343 
Third* .0588025 .0590113 .0506039 .0517376 .0457608 .0500852 .043476 .0153265+ .0521813 
Fourth* .0744488 .069582 .0657697 .0545522 .0563202 .061383 .0492463 .0252024+ .062871 
Fifth* .0734204 .0749124 .0696968 .0687416 .06425 .0634322 .0590452 .01437521 .068506 
o Means al Ihe mdlvldual level are slgmtícanlly dlfferent at the 5 Yo level. Palred test of medlans show also slgmtícant dlfferences between the tírst two, the last 
two and the t]¡ree intermediate ]¡our intervals. 
t Against t]¡e altemative hypo!hesis !hat !he mean of!he tírst trading hour is larger !han !he mean of!he last trading hour, equality of means is rejected at !he 5% 
level. 
I Against the altemative hypotheses thal Ihe mean and median of the first trading hour are larger than Ihe mean and median of the last trading hour, respeclively, 
equalily of means and medians is rejected al the 5% leve!. 
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TABLE6 
Market determinants: Intraday regular patterns. 
For each of the market determinants of Iiquidity considered. equation (T2) has been estimated using Pooled GLS 
with White's standard errors (robust to general heteroskedasticity within each cross-section unit). We also control 
for different heteroskedasticity across cross-sections. In order to control for autocorrelation within cross-sections. 
an autoregressive structure has been allowed on residuals. t 
7 5 
x" =a+ LJ3,DHs, + ¿o"DDh, +u" 
11'=J 11=) 
U i¡ = !rkU¡(I_:) +cil 
k=/ 
(T2) 
i represents the stock (the cross-sectional unit. i= 1 •...• 25) and t the trading hour (t=1.2 •...• 1778). DHs, (for s=2 to 7) 
are dummy variables that take the value I for the sth hour of the session and zero otherwise. DDh, (for h = 2 to 5) 
are dummy variables that take the value 1 for the hth trading day of the week and zero otherwise. e" is the error 
termo such that E[e·e}=fl. P' = (p2 ..... P7). O· = (02 ..... 05). y' = (yl ..... yJ and a are the coefficients ofthe mode!. a 
captures the Monday and the first half-hour of the session effects. We omit the o and y coefficients of the daily 
dummies and the autoregressive terms respectively. 
Panel A: MFfS 
Market determinants9 
Coefficient VOL TFREC RISK INF TICK COMP 
Intercept 260.0949* 11.41089* .098972* .1867* .590032* .379869* 
[10:00 1 \:00) -34.54917* -0.059819 -.022591 * -.04217* .100449* -.008697* 
[11 :00 12:00) -62.1541 * .938258* -.039084* -.026619 .134714* .018293* 
[12:00 13:00) -83.21754* 2.234545* -.04668* -.01574 .149212* -.009851 * 
[13:0014:00) -.92.09661 * 2.883077* -.04929* -.008135 .150967* .010336* 
[14:0015:00) -75.40341 * 1.85106* -.043263* -.056355* .14886* -.031220* 
[15:00 16:00] -25.02055* 0.013573 -.032694* -.082906* .130298* -.038078* 
Adjusted R1 .3396 .4241 .1097 .0879 .7604 .1924 
Panel B: LFTS 
Market determinants 
Coefficient VOL TFREC RISK INF TICK COMplfl 
Intercept 24.15444* 44.62192* .025815* .314563* .203957* .013665* 
[10:00 1 \:00) -7.494064* 4.245457* -.009963* -.023699 .02888* .004076* 
[1 \:0012:00) -8.249633* 4.554323* -.011716* .017490 .056908* .00136 
[12:0013:00) -11.00520* 5.997681 * -.014689* .087002* .067366* -.003898* 
[13:0014:00) -11.02949* 6.158546* -.014435* .088439* .071733* -.000599 
[14:0015:00) -8.170158* 4.669108* -.013722* .024792 .074117* -.000813 
[15:0016:00] -3.903045* 1.747851* -.010848* -.099497* .073349* .005961 * 
Adjusted R1 .0666 .3048 .0515 .0397 .6298 
§ VOL - square root of the accumulated share volume. TFREC - square root of the mean time interval (in 
seconds) between trades. RISK = standard deviation of the midpoint of the bid-ask spread with respect to the 
median for each periodo INF = standardized square root ofthe mean volume per transaction. TICK = percentage of 
time during which the quoted bid-ask spread equaled the tick ($ 118). COMP = ratio of share volume traded at the 
regional markets and NASD to volume traded at NYSE. MFTS = more frequently traded stocks. LFTS = less 
frequently traded stocks. 
t The z autoregressive terms for each measure have been selected after rejecting more complex specifications. 
starting with z = 7. 
t For this regression the Adjusted-R2 is almost zero. 
* Significant at the 5% leve!. 
** Significant at the 10% leve!. 
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TABLE7 
Liquidity and market conditions. 
Panel A: for each liquidity measure analyzed, equation (T3) has been estirnated using Pooled GLS with White's standard errors 
(robust to general heteroskedasticity within each cross-section unit) and controlling for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity. We 
allow for an autoregressive structure on residuals in order to control for autocorrelation and also in order to isolate the 
contemporaneous effect of each ofthe explanatory variables.* 
Yi,::::a + f3x i, +u ir 
UII :;;;: ¿YkU¡(t-k) + Ei¡ 
k=J 
(T3) 
Panel B: equation (T4) has been estimated using the same Pooled GLS procedure as in Panel A. 
Yü = a + f3J VOL" + f32TFREC" + f3,RISK" + f3,INFü + f3 5TICK" + f36 COMPü + U" (T4) 
, 
U it :::: LYkUiO-k) +Ej( 
k=/ 
i represents the stock (the cross-sectional unit, i=1 , ... ,25) and I the hour (t=1 ,2, ... ,1778). Cü is the error term, such that E[c·cJ=Q. 
¡J', y.=(yJ ..... yJ, and a are the coefficients ofthe mode!. In the table, we omit the coefficient estimates ofthe autoregressive terms. 
This table only reports the estimated f3s that are significant (at least) at the 5% leve!. Panel A also omits the constant termo x in 
(T3) is one of the following market variables: VOL = square root of the accumulated share volume, TFREC = square root of the 
mean time interval (in seconds) between trades, RlSK = standard deviation ofthe midpoint ofthe bid-ask spread with respect to its 
median for each period 1, INF = standardized square root of the mean volume per transaction, TICK = percentage of time during 
which the quoted bid-ask spread equaled the tick ($118) and COMP = ratio of share volume traded at the regional markets and 
NASD to volume traded at NYSE. MFTS = more frequently traded stocks, LFTS = less frequently traded stocks. 
Panel A: simple regressions 
MFTS YiI 
Xii RSWT EFSWV PIWV DWT WVNET BLM 
VOL 8.05e-07 4.26e-06t 4.03e-05 1.3805 23.8039 -.000572 
TFREC -5.9Ie-06 
-.OOOI12t -.000811 40.95 -73.7785 .009727 
RISK .001052 .060877 .212739 -5005.058 -551.5066 -1.5532 
INF 4.86e-05 .001403 .003334 502.09 3247.805 .020675 
TICK -.002645 -.008464 -.033568 4072.82 2618.872 1.152429 
COMP -.00011 -.002012 -.011559 -220.867 -3075.502 .049916 
LFTS Yi' 
XiI RSWT EFSWV PIWV DWT WVNET BLM 
VOL 1.02e-06 5.14e-05 .030323 1.14379 50.0707 -.001398 
TFREC -.000647 -.000135 -22.2253 .001848 
RISK .003332 .0564236 .424614 -458.5098 -1654.197 -1.95248 
1NF .005212 .003072 31.3259 1487.059 
.001859t 
TICK -.007734 -.02131 -.009412 -250.276 1285.111 .416244 
COMP -.000113 -.001933 -.00117 -135.0937 
Panel B: multivariate regression. 
Yit 
MFTS LFTS 
Variabl RSWT EFSWV DWT VNET RSWT EFSWV DWT WVNET 
e 
CONS. .0054* .115826* 8152.809* -1540.306* .0162* .089754* 2401.194* -5383.723* 
VOL 15.8982* 3.3ge-07* .90548* 76.62* 
TFREC -5.55e-06* 31.1909* 119.5684* 4.42e-06* .000878* 111.6038* 
RISK .000326* .072257* -4347.401 * -5145.303* .002218* .588037* -789.6174* -2650.233* 
INF l.2ge-05* .000572* 650.1301* 2178.041* 29.4025* 
TICK -.002709* 3862.257* 3239.257* -.007719* -.004761 * -255.03* 
COMP 6.4ge-06** -270.8911 * -1.96e-05* -.002601* -37.2656 
Adj-R1 .9669 .3712 .4696 .4368 .8978 .3353 .7623 .4562 
t Not significant at the 5% level when regular intraday pattems are taken into account. 
* The number ofautoregressive terms has been selected after rejecting more complex specifications, starting with z=7. 
* Significant at the 5% leve!. 















Intraday regular patterns. 






















(a) ReIative Spread (b) Effective Spread 
FIGURE 2 










Ca) Quoted depth (b) Realized depth (VNET) 
FIGURE 3 
BLM: Intraday regular effects 
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Price impact: intraday regular patterns (MFTS). 
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This sample consists of the 25 frrms with the highest trading frequency (MFTS) and the 25 frrms with the lowest 
trading frequency (LFTS) among 150 firms in a larger sample selected by Systematic Sampling. Firms are sorted by 
time between mean trades. 
MFTS 
Orderby Time between trades Time between changes in 
capitalization Symbol Name quotes' 
I GE GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 00:00:26 00:00:33 
7 TXN TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 00:00:39 00:00:56 
6 CMB CHASE MANHA TT AN CO 00:00:43 00:00:35 
2 GTE GTECORP 00:00:53 00:00:58 
4 SLB SCHLUMBERGER L TD 00:01:19 00:01:08 
21 ELY CALLAWAYGOLFCO 00:01:29 00:01:28 
11 GP GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 00:01:56 00:01:20 
23 USS U. S. SURGICAL CORP 00:02:01 00:01 :30 
5 GRN GENERAL RE CORP 00:02:02 00:01:35 
20 HM HOMESTAKE MINING CO 00:02:14 00:01:56 
8 HPC HERCULES INC 00:02:20 00:02:43 
3 K KELLOGCO 00:02:22 00:01:17 
22 GLM GLOBAL MARINE INC 00:02:24 00:02:20 
10 MAT MATTELINC 00:02:33 00:02:58 
16 EC ENGELHARO CO 00:02:32 00:01:56 
12 NCC NATIONAL CITY CORP 00:02:48 00:02:07 
17 DDS DlLLARO DEPT STO RES CL A 00:02:48 00:01:39 
14 IR INGERSOLL-RAND CO 00:02:51 00:0\:49 
24 ROC ROWAN COMPANIES INC 00:03:13 00:02:40 
9 AGC AMER GEN CORP 00:03:34 00:02:19 
27 ANN ANNTAYLORSTORESCORP 00:03:45 00:02:33 
19 RYC RA YCHEM CORP 00:03:52 00:02:31 
18 CEN CERIDlAN CORP 00:03:58 00:02:46 
15 OEC OHIO EDlSON CORP 00:04:09 00:02:58 
13 ROH ROHM AND HASS COMPANY 00:04:11 00:02:57 
LFTS 
29 MTS MONTGOMERY STR INC. SECS 00:36:39 00:29:46 
30 MMI MMI COMPANIES INC 00:36:44 00:23:15 
36 LXP LEXINGTON CORP PROP. INC 00:37:44 00:22:42 
41 KEF KOREA EQUITY FUND INC 00:39:40 00:18:29 
44 SNM SINTER MET ALS INC 00:43:52 00:35:06 
46 IF INDONESIA FUND INC 00:43:59 00:24:37 
42 UA UNIONAMERICA HLDGS 00:45:56 00:29:32 
33 SHD SHERWOOD GROUP INC 00:46:10 00:29:56 
32 PFM PREFERRED I.M. FUND INC 00:46:14 00:25:01 
28 GNC GUARANTY NA TIONAL CORP 00:49:21 00:24:31 
25 JWA WILEY JOHN SONS INC CL A 00:50:09 00:21:09 
40 ODC OIL-DRI CORP. OF AMERICA 00:53:58 00:27:37 
31 WHT WHITEHALL CORP 00:55:52 00:26:59 
39 WTX WORLDTEX INC 00:55:56 00:37:34 
34 BAR BANNERAEROSPACE INC 00:56:28 00:25:53 
45 CAN CONTINENTAL CAN CO INC 01:14:31 00:39:11 
35 MYM MUNIYIELD MICHIGAN FUND INC 01:14:31 00:39:50 
49 BNG BENETTON GROUP S.P.A. 0\:26:24 00:50:16 
48 VCO VINA CONCHA y TORO 01:27:05 00:40:43 
47 BAS BASS PUB L TD CO 01:31:16 00:54:02 
26 NYM NYMAGICINC 01:31:26 00:45:24 
43 UIF USLIFE INCOME FUND INC 01:38:40 00:48:30 
50 EEC ENVIRONMENTAL ELEM. CORP 02:15:20 01:16:06 
38 BPC BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES 02:40:19 00:51:24 
37 TDl TWIN DlSC INCORPORATED 02:40:07 01:10:16 
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TVol/ 12 - median[TVolg~)] 
INF(d,h) = ' 
t [ 1/2 ]' Std.Dev median(TVol(q,m)J 
"i( q,m) S.t. q =d, m = h 
Specifications 
1 is the number of quotes registered during 
a given time interval. Tj represents the 
time elapsed (in seconds) till a new quote 
is observed. 
Same specifications as for the relative 
spread. 
r is the number of trades in an hourly 
interval. Vol¡ is the number of shares 
negotiated with the ith trade. XI equals 1 
for buyer initiated orders and -1 for seller 
initiated orders. 
Same specifications as for the effective 
spread. mI is the midpoint of the quoted 
bid-ask spread assigned to the trade i. PI + r 
is the midpoint associated with the frrst 
trade reported at least five minutes later. r 
represents the time elapsed (r~5 minutes). 
P is the number of midpoint changes. Llmw 
is the magnitude of the change. k is the 
number of trades between two different 
values of the rnidpoint. Xg takes the value 
1 for buyer initiated trades and -1 for 
seller initiated trades. 
TVol1 represents the share volume per 
trade in hour t. 
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